Parishes Without Resident Pastors Steady in Number, Canon 517.2 Parishes in Decline

Since 1985, the Catholic Church in the United States has experienced a net loss of 11.6% of its parishes. As we’ve noted previously, much of this change has occurred with closures and mergers in New York and Pennsylvania while parish growth has occurred in the South and West. Some of these changes have occurred due to Catholics moving from urban areas in the Northeast and Midwest to the suburbs and the Sunbelt in the South and West. Fewer Catholics in an area means the need for fewer parishes while growth in the Catholic population requires the opening of new parishes.

Also part of this equation though is the number of priests available to serve as pastors in parishes. In 1985, there were 1.5 active diocesan priests per parish in the United States. Today, there is 1.0 active diocesan priests per parish. Canon Law stipulates that “If the diocesan bishop should decide that due to a dearth of priests a participation in the exercise of the pastoral care of the parish is to be entrusted to a deacon or to some other person who is not a priest or to a community of persons, he is to appoint some priest endowed with the powers and faculties of a pastor to supervise the pastoral care” (Canon 517.2).

About 15 years ago, there were more than 500 parishes entrusted to someone other than a priest. This represented about 17% of the parishes without a resident pastor (most were administered by non-resident pastors with multiple assignments). As of now, just 341 parishes are entrusted to a deacon or other lay person or about 10% of parishes without a resident pastor.

Forty-two percent of these parishes are entrusted to a deacon and 37% to a lay man or woman. Seventeen percent are entrusted to a religious brother or sister and a small number are entrusted to a team of persons (4%).

As shown on the map below, the states where one would be most likely to find a parish entrusted to a deacon or other lay person are Wisconsin (55 parishes), New York (38), Alaska (32), Michigan (28), and California (23).

 Note: Five Canon 517.2 parishes are in non-geographic eparchies and are not shown on this map.

Although the number of ordinations of priests has increased slightly in recent years (as well as priests from outside the country coming to serve here), the number of diocesan priests who are active in ministry is in decline. In 1985, 84% of diocesan priests were active in ministry. Today, only 66% are active in ministry. This, in addition to losses of priests due to mortality, continue to lead to net losses of priests each year. Parish mergers and closures have kept the number of parishes without resident pastors steady. The question is how long is this sustainable? Entrusting parishes to deacons or lay people seem to be an option being used less often.

At the same time, globally speaking, U.S. bishops use Canon 517.2 more often than bishops elsewhere. Some 7.6% of Catholic parishes worldwide are in the United States. Yet, 18% of all Canon 517.2 parishes entrusted to a deacon or lay person are in the United States.

Many of the figures used in this post are available on CARA’s Frequently Requested Statistics. These have just been updated with a number of new trends.

What Should You Eat On Friday?

(Image not intended as an answer to the question above. Not an endorsement!)

CARA’s national surveys indicate that more than six in ten self-identified adult Catholics in the United States will abstain from eating meat on Fridays during Lent. Unlike many of the other trends we track, this is not a practice in decline and is just as likely to be done by young adult Catholics as their elders. It also fits well in the social media age where people can have fun posting images of their non-meat foods. If you run a food establishment that is open for business on Fridays during Lent you are also likely financially concerned about the impact of 31,995,000 Catholic consumers (extrapolating from the survey data) looking for something to eat made of something other than meat.

Last Lent I gave up meat for the whole season. I am sure I just wasn’t doing vegetarianism “correctly” but I have to say it was the least healthy I have ever felt. When Lent ended, I went on a high protein diet (lots of meat) and now feel much less likely to die any time soon. Therefore, this Lent I had to think about what in the heck am I am going to eat on the days where I have to abstain from meat again (all Catholics, ages 14 or older, are called to abstain on Ash Wednesday and Fridays during Lent).

This question called for some statistical analysis. The most challenging meal for many working age Catholics might be lunch. You aren’t at home and there likely aren’t any parish fish dinners available at this time. This often means one might buy a quick meal from a restaurant. I dug into the 2019 non-meat offerings at national fast and fast-casual chains and our findings might surprise some. I assume that a Catholic diner is looking to skip the meat but get as much protein (and fiber) as they can as a nutritional goal. I also assume they look to keep calorie and carbohydrate counts reasonable and minimize fat (...well maybe not keto Catholics), sodium, and sugar. Unfortunately taste is too subjective to be considered.

Although it varies by activity level, the average American needs around 2,000 calories per day and should try not to exceed 65 grams of fat and 2,300 milligrams of sodium. A healthier intake of sugar would be about 35 grams per day. To keep the comparisons fair, one Lent-friendly meal per establishment is evaluated and the base meal is a fish sandwich and medium fries (drink excluded). Some of the restaurants offer neither so the closest equivalent is considered in these cases. How do the menus this Lent stack up within these guidelines? I ranked them all on each nutritional outcome and the figure below shows the average rank (i.e., a lower rank indicates a better outcome given my assumptions) for each meal and establishment.

For me, someone looking to eat somewhat healthy and get as much protein as possible, Panera Bread’s tuna sandwich on focaccia with potato chips might be ideal. It is ranked overall as the 5th “healthiest” option this year (quotations are used because I am a doctor but not that kind of doctor…) providing 800 calories, 43 grams of fat (66% of daily limit), 75 grams of carbohydrates, 30 grams of protein, 1,520 milligrams of sodium (63% of daily limit), 5 grams of fiber, and 6 grams of sugar.

The “healthiest” option overall, given my assumptions, would be a Subway’s 6-inch tuna sandwich on Italian bread with potato chips. It is only 610 calories (no cheese but your choice of any vegetables allowed), but it has significantly less protein than Panera at 21 grams. On the positive side, Subway also offers less fat (35 grams), fewer carbs (53 grams), and lower sodium (780 milligrams).

The next “best” option to Subway may surprise—it’s the original fast food Lent offering. McDonald’s Filet-O-Fish with medium fries is surprisingly lighter than many other options. This meal comes in at only 610 calories with 35 grams of fat, 82 grams of carbohydrates, 21 grams of protein, 780 milligrams of sodium, 6 grams of fiber, and 5 grams of sugar.  Outside of elevated fats these nutritional targets measure close to 1/3 of what one would expect in a day’s eating. This was a meal specifically designed for the Catholic consumer in 1960s Cincinnati. Nutritionally, it is still not a bad option.

Which meal meets or exceeds some generally recognized daily nutritional goals? It’s one where there was not an equivalent to the fish sandwich and fries and this may have made it a less than fair comparison. If you wanted Chipotle you might order a sofritas burrito bowl (also including beans, rice, fajitas, cheese, salsa, lettuce, and sour cream) with a side of chips and guacamole. This amounts to 1,530 calories with 79.5 grams of fat, 165 grams of carbohydrates, 38 grams of protein (best of any meal evaluated), 2,800 milligrams of sodium (exceeding daily total maximum), 27 grams of fiber (best of any meal evaluated), and 14 grams of sugar. So if you are looking for maximum protein and fiber this is the choice but it comes with some other less desirable outcomes. This could also be a better option by cutting out the chips and guacamole and keeping the cheese and sour cream out of the burrito bowl. This option would only provide 545 calories, 15.5 grams of fat, 21 grams of protein, 81 grams of carbohydrates, 1,770 milligrams of sodium, 14 grams of fiber, and 9 grams of sugar. But would this be a meal that is really an equivalent to a fish sandwich and fries? It’s probably a bit too far on the lighter side.

While KFC does not appear to have a meat-free Lent option (unless you are lucky enough to be in Guam), Chick-fil-A does. A fish sandwich joins the lineup (at participating locations) for Lent. While the sandwich does not have complete nutritional information from the company, it appears to be similar, based on other sources, to McDonald’s once one factors in the side of fries. It comes in as the third “healthiest” relative to the recommended daily values. If you want a more calorie packed (and flavorful?) fish sandwich and fries you could try Wendy’s, Burger King, or Arby’s. These all exceed 850 calories, 100 carbohydrates, 40 grams of fat, and about 1,500 milligrams of sodium or more. Arby’s comes in with the highest numbers for the fish and fries meal for fat, carbs, sodium, and sugar (…this is the franchise with the tag line “We have the meats!” so it may not surprise that it is not likely the first option for a Friday during Lent).

Hardee’s and Carl’s Jr. have offered a beer battered fish sandwich in the past. However, as of Ash Wednesday, it was not an option that was active from their menu windows online. Instead, under their “Better for you options” they currently offer a Veg It Thickburger, which appears to be a toppings loaded burger without the meat. We utilized this for our analysis (with medium fries). The fish sandwich from previous years would have been less “healthy.” Taco Bell also requires some selective ordering. We went with the Cheesy Bean and Rice Burrito with Nacho Fries for the analysis. It offers the lowest protein option but ranks second highest in fiber.

As we have noted in the past, Catholics are a relatively healthy bunch in the United States. Hopefully, our review of 2019 offerings helps you make some menu decisions this year. A recent scientific study showed that knowing what you are consuming may be one of the easiest steps to maintaining your health. 

McDonald’s background image courtesy of michaelgoodin.

Where the Parish Doors Have Closed … and Opened

One of the most common news stories about the Catholic Church in recent years involve parish closures. These events often gain local attention and time from time get coverage nationally. When the story is national, the closure(s) sometimes seems as if this is something generalizable. The national data (for territorial Latin rite dioceses) seem to fit this characterization with the Church now operating 1,437 fewer parishes than it had in 1971.

Note: Figure excludes parishes in Eastern rite eparchies

What often gets lost in these stories (and in the national numbers) is that closures are a much more regional and local phenomenon. CARA has often referred to a “Tale of Two Churches” (1, 2) where pastors in different parts of the country tend to be worried about different things (keeping the lights on vs. finding space for more pews and parking spaces).

The net loss of parishes has been most heavily concentrated in dioceses in a handful of states. Really two states lead the pack in reducing their numbers of parishes. Pennsylvania has reduced its number of parishes by 532 since 1971 and New York by 500 during the same period. Other states have experienced increases in parishes, offsetting some of these losses including Texas, which has added 293 parishes, Florida which has added 165 parishes, and Arizona and New Mexico (the Diocese of Gallup crosses state lines) which added 121. The states in blue on the following map (click the map to see a larger version) have fewer parishes now than they had in 1971 and those in green have more now than in 1971.

The pattern in parish losses and gains follows economic and social mobility changes in the country more generally. The Sunbelt in the South has attracted population growth while the Rustbelt in the Northeast and Midwest have seen population drains over the decades. The Catholic Church, diocese by diocese, has responded to these changes by closing parishes in areas with losses and opening them in the states where population gains have occurred. It is important to note that these population gains have also included new arrivals from outside the United States as well.

In some urban dioceses that attracted the first waves of Catholic immigration from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, churches were built to serve the needs of people from particular countries like Italy, Poland, Germany, and Ireland. In some cases, parish buildings were built in close proximity to each other in cities catering to the language and culture of the specific immigrant groups needing pastoral care and access to the sacraments. Now many years removed from this immigration and often with Catholics having left long ago for the suburbs or the Sunbelt, parish buildings are underutilized. This is part of the story of what happened with some of the parish closures in areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. In some other areas, shortages of priests have led to reorganizations that involve parish closures and clergy being assigned to administer multiple parishes. However, there are limits to how many parishes a single priest can realistically administer geographically. Finances also play a role. Since 2000, the average Catholic family has given $10 a week to their parish. In some cases, the number of these active families present in parish communities are not sufficient in numbers to make the operation of a parish viable in the long-term. Closures here have also been made due to this lack of funding.

In many ways, it has been easier for the Church to close parishes than build new sites. While growth is evident throughout the South (outside of Louisiana) and West, the Catholic population of this region has increased much more quickly than new brick and mortar construction. Nowhere is this more evident than in Georgia where the Catholic population has increased from about 110,000 in 1971 to more than 1 million today (+858%). While the state has added 67 parishes during this period, the number of Catholics per parish has increased from 1,396 in 1971 to 7,235 in 2018.

States with fewer Catholics today than in 1971 include Pennsylvania (-17% fewer), Rhode Island (-17%), Michigan (-16%), Vermont (-16%), Massachusetts (-14%), Louisiana (-10%), Ohio (-9%), Connecticut (-9%), Illinois (-4%), North Dakota (-2%), and Wisconsin (-2%). Other than Georgia, states with significantly more Catholics now than in 1971 include North Carolina (+922% more; 73,600 to 752,500), Nevada (+635%), South Carolina (+582%), Utah (+370%), Florida (+298%), Tennessee (+285%), and Virginia (+265%).  
 
New York has experienced no real net growth nor loss in the total number of Catholics residing in the state. Thus, there is more to the story of parish closures in New York than simple population change. Here, the geographic distribution of this population and of the parishes (particularly in urban areas) is likely central. It is also important to note that even with the net loss of 500 parishes in New York, there remains 1,203 parishes open and the number of Catholics per parish has only increased modestly from 4,048 in 1971 to 5,743 today. By comparison, in Nevada, a state that has gained 20 parishes since 1971, the number of Catholics per parish today is 12,639.

Parish photo courtesy of Massachusetts Office Of Travel & Tourism.

Jesuit Global Demographics in 2018

This post is by Georges Alsankary and Thomas Gaunt, SJ and is released for the feast day (tomorrow, Dec. 21) of St. Peter Canisius, SJ (1521–1597). It is the third post in a series (1, 2) in which CARA tracks changes among the Jesuits worldwide.

The Jesuits are the world’s largest religious order with active ministries spanning across six continents. They steadily increased in number from their restoration in 1814 until 1965 when they reached their peak membership of 36,000.  Since 1965 the total number of Jesuits worldwide has declined to 15,842 in 2017 but most notably the membership of the Jesuits has dramatically realigned by culture and ethnicity. Recent developments show a change in growth and expansion of the population of Jesuits: the largest national group used to be the US Jesuits, but now is the Jesuits of India. Africa and Asia have numerous young Jesuits, whereas Europe and North America are challenged by a large number of elderly Jesuits.

Worldwide the changing number of Jesuits is driven by three factors: the number of men entering the novitiate, the number of men departing the Jesuits, and the number of Jesuits that die each year. A growth in the number of Jesuit usually implies entrance groups being larger in number than the groups who leave or die. A steady decline would be the reverse of this.

For administrative purposes the Society of Jesus is organized into 76 provinces and independent regions.  They then grouped into six geographic conferences or assistancies:

• Africa – All of Africa and Madagascar except North Africa.
• Latin America – All of South America, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
• South Asia – India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan.
• Asia Pacific – Australia, Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, East Timor, New Zealand, and Myanmar.
• Europe – Europe, Russia, Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa.
• North America – United States (including Puerto Rico), Canada, Haiti, Jamaica, Belize and Micronesia

Note: Canada used to be part of the European assistancy, and Puerto Rico used to be in the Latin American assistancy. Both are currently in the North American assistancy as of 2016. Data has been adjusted to reflect these changes.
 
Overall Numbers:
The Data below shows the total number of Jesuits at ten year intervals (1987, 1997, 2007, and 2017).
Both Africa and South Asia are showing steady increase in the number of Jesuits, while both Latin America and Asia Pacific are decreasing in numbers. The Assistancies of Europe and North America show a steep decline in membership, more than 50% over the same 30 years.  If the trend continues the South Asia Assistancy will soon be the largest outnumbering Europe, North America, and Latin America.

Entering novices:
The number of novices entering the novitiate of each province can vary significantly year by year, therefore a more accurate picture is provided if we look at how many men enter the novitiate over five year intervals.  The graph below shows a stabilization over the past ten years in the number of novices entering in the Society of Jesus, even in places where there was previously a sharp decline.

The distribution of entering novices remains largely the same with respect to what it was 5 years ago: South Asia has the largest number, followed by Africa and Latin America. The clear majority of the younger Jesuits (64%) are still coming from Asia and Africa.

 

Departures from the Jesuits:
The Jesuits, like all other religious institutes experience a departure of a large number of the men who enter the novitiate, these departures usually occur in the years of formation before ordination (often ten years after entering) or final vows (often 15 to 20 years after entering). The general pattern of departures follows the earlier pattern of entrances for each assistancy, and the number of departures across the assistancies are close to what they were 5 years ago, and markedly lower than the past number of departures 15 or 20 years ago.

Entrants minus Departures:
The sustainability of the membership of a religious community relies on their being more entrances than departures over the course of years.  The graph below shows the gain or loss for each assistancy of the Jesuits in five-year periods over the past 30 years.  South Asia and Africa have had large sustained gains in members in each period of time.  Asia Pacific has shown a smaller, but stabilizing gain, and Europe a diminished but stabilizing gain. The North America has shown periods of a loss of members (more men departing than entering over a five-year period), although it now shows a net gain in recent years, while Latin America has only recently shown a small increase.

Number of Deaths
The vast majority of older Jesuits who entered prior to 1960 are in Europe and North America, and there are fewer older Jesuits in Africa and Asia. The Jesuits in Europe and North America have consistently accounted for about two-thirds of all the deaths over the past 30 years while the proportion of European and North American Jesuits have gone from 60% to 44% percent of the Jesuit membership.

Entrances minus Departures minus Deaths: Net Gain or Loss
When the number of men leaving the Jesuits is subtracted from the number entering and then the number of deaths are subtracted from that figure, we have the net gain or loss in Jesuit membership.  In combining these three basic demographic elements we see clearly the large and continuous impact of the declining number of Jesuits in Europe and North America, and to a lesser extent Latin America.  Only Africa and  Asia Pacific consistently record any net gain in Jesuits year over year, and that gain is dwarfed by the losses of Europe and North America. While Africa and South Asia may have a net gain of 100 to 200 Jesuits over a five-year period, Europe and North America have a net loss 1,200 to 1,300 Jesuits.

Observations:
The membership trends observed five years ago have not significantly changed: the number of Jesuits are stabilizing across the board in all parts of the world, and there are no dramatic shifts in any particular region; there is a slight decline in the number of men entering the novitiate, but it is accompanied by a stabilization in the numbers of deaths, which makes for a reduced net decrease over time.

The very large number of Jesuits in Europe and North America who die each year is the main demographic factor driving the geographic shift of Jesuits as the net decline in the number of Jesuits worldwide is slowing down.

The continued growth in the number of younger Jesuits in Africa and South Asia means that there will be a continuing re-alignment of where Jesuits are serving the Church.  If the trends continue, the Society of Jesus will in the coming decade or two be defined more by the cultures and experiences of Asia and Africa, and less by Europe and North America.

Image courtesy of Sharon M Leon.

Political Divide is a Constant Among Catholics

Although the media (and many pollsters) continue to be infatuated with how Evangelicals vote it is really American Catholics that are always the most interesting at election time. Evangelicals vote Republican in consistent majorities. Catholics are the only major religious group in the United States that are fairly evenly split between the parties and the manner in which they lean often tilt the results one way or the other.

Overall, 52.3% of voting eligible Catholics turned out for the midterms (Sources: AP, Fox News, NORC and the United States Election Project). The map below shows where Catholics voted for Democrats over Republicans (blue states) and where they chose Republicans over Democrats (red states). No data is available in five states and the District Columbia. The state level data is based on Senate or gubernatorial elections (governor’s races are only used in states without Senate contests).

The overall vote of Catholics was evenly split with 47% voting for Democrats and 47% voting for Republicans (Edison Research’s exit polls estimated Catholics voted 50% Democrat and 49% Republican nationally. CARA does not utilize Edison here because they only ask a religious affiliation question in state-level polling in a very small number of states). Catholics voted Republican in 23 states (that will encompass 221 Electoral College votes looking ahead to 2020) and they voted Democrat in 21 states (274 Electoral College votes). The map below shows the intensity of the red or blue vote shares.

It is also important to note that an estimated 23.4 million eligible Catholics did not vote in the 2018 midterms. The Catholic voting eligible population (VEP) totals 49 million (Catholic voting age population, including non-citizens and others ineligible to vote, is 53 million). Catholics made up 23% of all voters, which is larger than the share of self-identified Catholics among U.S. adults (21%). While the 2018 results offer some insight into what might happen in 2020 it is also important to consider that some of the Senate and gubernatorial election dynamics (e.g., Democrat Sen. Joe Manchin winning in West Virginia) are unlikely to be reproduced in a national contest and more Catholics will likely go to the polls in 2020.

The Contribution of Religious Sisters to Parochial Schools in the United States

This post is authored by CARA researchers Michal Kramarek and Fr. Thomas Gaunt, SJ (also CARA's Executive Director). It provides a brief look at the contribution of religious sisters to the parochial schools in the United States. The bibliographic information for the references included in the text can be found here. 

Written discourse about Catholic parochial schools in the United States has been in decline since 1970’s. In fact, after enjoying over a century of higher attention, the frequency with which the topic appears in American publications in recent years is reverting to levels prior to the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore of 1884 (as shown in the chart below).

While the motto of “Every Catholic child in a Catholic school” attributed to the Council was never fulfilled (Hunt and Kunkel 1988, 286), the accomplishments of those who often committed their entire lives to its pursuit are nonetheless remarkable. The scale of those accomplishments can be illustrated by the sheer size of the parochial school system in its heyday, in the 1960’s:

• In 1960, there were 68 Catholic schools for every 100 Catholic parishes (Kenedy 1961).
• In 1963-1964, there was an all-time high of 13,205 Catholic elementary and secondary schools (Snyder 1993, 49).
• In 1965-1966, there was an all-time high of 5.6 million baby boomers in Catholic elementary and secondary schools which constituted 87 percent of nonpublic school enrollment (Hunt and Kunkel 1988, 277) and 12 percent of the entire Catholic population (Kenedy 1966).
• In the 1960s, “[t]here was hardly a town of more than 30,000 inhabitants in the United States lacking a parochial school” (Stewart 1994, 428).

Those remarkable accomplishments bring about the issue of how it was all possible. After all, the financial cost of such an undertaking must have been considerable. Or, was it? The answer to this question depends on the point of reference. For example, Burns (1912, 290-293) estimated the overall cost of education in Catholic parish schools nationwide (including cost of maintenance, salaries, supplies, apparatus, heat and light, repairs, interest and insurance), in 1909, at $9,898,008 ($268 million in 2017 dollars). By comparison, he estimated the cost of the equivalent education in public schools to be over three times higher, at $30,511,010.

The rise and decline of Catholic parochial schools appears to be partially a function of changes in the relative cost of operating those schools. The changes in relative cost were, in turn, primarily driven by the immense sacrificial service contributed by religious sisters (e.g., Burns 1912, 284; Stewart 1994, 327). In strictly financial terms, this sacrificial service can be measured as the difference between the amount of salary received by lay teachers in public schools and the amount of salary-equivalent/stipend received by religious sisters in parochial schools (i.e., the salary forgone, for a lack of better term) multiplied by the number of religious sisters in teaching positions.

In regard to the first factor, the salary forgone, the table below summarizes available historical estimates for the stipend of religious sisters in teaching positions. In available years, this stipend was roughly one quarter of the salary of lay teachers in public schools. A caveat should be added that this comparison, while illustrative, is severely limited, because it does not account for many differences between the two groups (e.g., value of room and board, educational requirements, average amount of teaching experience, additional sources of income, retirement funding, or cost of living).

It is also important to point out that the sacrifice of the sisters is larger than the ratio might be implying, because a salary’s utility does not change linearly (i.e., reducing the disposable income does not reduce the quality of life as much as reducing the income needed to cover basic expenses). Sisters monetary compensation shown in the table below is so low by today’s standards it is hard to imagine to us today. Notably, it was also hard to imagine in the past. For example, Oates (1985, 184) described a situation where “[e]ven though salaries paid religious brothers were approximately twice those provided sisters for the same work the men found them insufficient.” Stewart (1994, 322, 408) described sisters’ frugality as “extreme” and their wages to be “meager,” and only allowing for “bare subsistence.”

In regard to the second factor lowering the cost of parochial schools, the chart below shows the number of religious sisters in teaching positions. Notably, the highest number of religious sisters in teaching positions was recorded in 1965 when the parochial system was about to reach its all-time high (as described above). However, the number of religious sisters as a percentage of all teachers in parochial schools was already in decline, which might be an indication that the salary cost increase outpaced the system growth. This might have exacerbated the decline beyond what was the result of decreasing number of religious sisters in the following decades.

A caveat should be added here that other reasons also played a role in the decline of the parochial school system. Those reasons include, for example, public school systems catching up with the rapid population growth, the migration of Catholic population from cities to suburbs, and from Northeast to West (thus away from places where parochial schools were established).

So, how much of the difference did the religious sisters make? What was their contribution as measured by, so to speak, the amount of forgone salary? In 1965, when the Catholic education system was at its largest, an estimated 103,314 religious sisters held teaching positions (Stewart 1994, 419). In this period, religious sisters received approximately one third of the salaries made by lay teachers in Catholic schools (Hesburgh, Hochwalt, and Shuster 1966) and salaries of lay teachers in Catholic schools were 5 percent to 10 percent lower than salaries of lay teachers in public schools (Koob and Shaw 1970). The annual amount of salary paid to lay teachers in public schools was $6,935 (Snyder 1993, 46-48). Based on those numbers, the sacrificial service of religious sisters teaching in Catholic schools in 1965 alone allowed the Catholic schools to save an estimated $0.5 billion ($3.8 billion in 2017 dollars) relative to public schools.

It is important to point out that those large aggregate amounts are only possible due to daily sacrifices of religious sisters that accrued over a lifetime of teaching work. “[The] phenomenal expansion [of the parochial schools] would have been impossible without sacrificial giving by laity and commitment by the rapidly increasing numbers of sisters who taught without remuneration beyond bare subsistence” (Stewart 1994, 322).

While the attention of those leading the discourse about the needs of the Catholic community in the United States shifts to other, important topics, we may be well advised to remember the extraordinary financial contribution that tens of thousands of sisters made to the Catholic Church each year for decades- as much as $3.8 billion in a single year.

Top image source: Sister Joellen Kohlmann teaching religion at Guardian Angels Central Catholic High School from “Nuns getting harder to find in Catholic schools.” Please read this story for more context to the research presented in this post. Photographer and author of that story: Jerry Guenther, Norfolk Daily News.

Pain Never Disappears from Unhealed Wounds

As a survey researcher who has studied Catholic reactions to news of allegations of clergy sexual abuse of minors since 2002, I have noticed that there is a detail about the crisis that seems to get distorted at times. In 2012, the last time we asked Catholics about the crisis in a national poll, 21% of adult Catholics could correctly identify that the abuse cases were more common before 1985 than since. The fact that any abuse occurred at all, regardless of when, is horrifying to me and the victims deserve justice and anything that could help them with the damages that resulted from these criminal acts. Yet, this detail is important in understanding the causes of the scandal, what legal actions are possible, and the steps that can be taken to prevent any future abuse.

The authors of the Pennsylvania grand jury report were careful to note that, “We know that the bulk of the discussion in this report concerns events that occurred before the early 2000’s” (p. 6). At the same time they correctly note that abuse “has not yet disappeared” and there are a couple of more recent allegations detailed in their findings. As they note, “Many of the priests who we profile here are dead” (p. 12). Dates for birth, year of ordination, and death are not available for all the accused in the report (some are seminarians or brothers and were never ordained). Forty-four percent of the accused in the report are known to be dead (five were born in the 19th century). Their average age at death was 73. Among the accused who are still alive or presumed alive, the average age today is 71. Priests accused of abuse in the Pennsylvania grand jury report, on average, were born in 1933 and ordained as priests in 1961. Outside of Pennsylvania, allegations of abuse have also been levied recently against former Cardinal Theodore McCarrick. He was similarly born in 1930 and ordained a priest in 1958. 

There is something to this generational pattern and this finding was first uncovered in the scientific study of the abuse crisis in 2004 by researchers at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. They noted in 2004, “The majority of men in this study were born between 1920 and 1950 and were ordained in their mid- to late-twenties.” The most common decade of birth for alleged abusers was the 1930s and the most common decade of ordination was the 1960s. This profile has not changed in allegations that emerged in the 14 years that have followed—including the recent grand jury report. No new wave of abuse has emerged in the United States.

The clergy sex abuse scandal unfolding in the news today is the same public scandal that erupted with national media reports in 2002 (beginning in Boston). It is likely, but no one can be sure, that the cases in the grand jury report have already been present in existing allegation totals (reports to the John Jay researchers are cited as a source for information about allegations in the grand jury report). Just as then, the abuse in the headlines most often occurred in the 1960s through the 1980s.

What is revealed new in the grand jury report is a level of detail that previous investigations have not often included. The authors report on a “playbook” that Church leaders allegedly used to handle allegations of clergy sex abuse in the state prior to 2002. “It seemed as if there was a script. Through the end of the 20th century, the dioceses developed consistent strategies for hiding child sex abuse” (p. 297). This strategy included the use of euphemisms in documentation that minimized abuse as conduct that was “inappropriate” or related to “boundary issues.” The dioceses’ investigations appeared to be deficient or biased, according to the grand jury. Many accused priests were sent for treatment in a clinical approach to the abuse rather than what should have occurred—criminal reporting. Once these treatments were considered complete, abusers were often returned to ministry in new assignments. The allegations were rarely, if ever, disclosed publicly. Victims rarely received the care they needed, let alone justice. The grand jury concludes that, “The repeating pattern of the bishops’ behavior left us with no doubt that, even decades ago, the church understood that the problem was prevalent” (p. 300). Further, “The bishops weren’t just aware of what was going on; they were immersed in it. And they went to great lengths to keep it secret. The secrecy helped spread the disease” (p. 300).

This strategy is not entirely dissimilar to the responses of other institutions when faced with any accusations of sexual abuse of minors whether it has been scouting groups, public schools, prep schools, universities, or in youth athletics. These types of institutions seem to attract sexual abusers of minors who seek positions of trust and respect with access to young people. The the John Jay researchers noted in 2011, “Sexual victimization of children is a serious and pervasive issue in society. It is present in families, and it is not uncommon in institutions where adults form mentoring and nurturing relationships with adolescents, including schools and religious, sports, and social organizations” (p.5).

The Church failed in responding to accusations of abuse and more often chose to cover up the criminal activity than disclose and report it. The Church in some cases sought non-disclosure agreements in civil settlements with victims—a practice that the grand jury believes should be abolished. What was often different in the Church than elsewhere, especially prior to 2000, was the clinical response to abuse—sending abusers for treatment and allowing them to return to ministry after this was completed. These were grave errors in judgment. This allowed abusers the potential to return to work and continue to abuse. It also ignored the legal obligation to seek justice for crimes committed.

That playbook, to the degree it was used broadly, appears to have changed in 2002. The report authors note, “On the whole, the 2002 [Dallas] Charter did move things in the right direction” and that “external forces have also generated much of the change” (p. 302). They note concern that the Church’s 2002 Dallas Charter still leaves too much of the decision making to diocesan bishops. The external changes brought by mandated abuse reporter laws, longer statutes of limitations, and increased public awareness have created a new reality. They write, “Today we sense some progress is made” (p. 303) often by actors external to the Church rather than from within it.  

Have new allegations of abuse declined as a result? The John Jay researchers aggregated the number of allegations of clergy sexual abuse of minors from 1950 to 2002. Their study included allegations made by 10,667 individuals. CARA has collected the numbers of new allegations of sexual abuse by clergy since 2004. CARA’s studies, through 2017, include 8,694 allegations. The distribution of cases reported to CARA are nearly identical to the distribution of cases, over time, in John Jay’s results. We know the year that each alleged abuse began for 8,206 cases. For 488, this is not known. The figure below shows the cases where we can place these in time.

New abuse allegations have not disappeared. In the last three years, 22 allegations of abuse occurring during 2015-2017 have been made. This is an average of about seven per year nationwide in the Church. That is far too many. Nothing is acceptable other than zero. At the same time, to put those reports in some context, 42 teachers in the state of Pennsylvania, where the grand jury reported from, lost their licenses to educate for sexual misconduct in 2017. As recently as 2015, 65 teachers in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) were in “teacher jail” for accusations of sexual abuse or harassment in that county alone. The current wave of “educator sexual misconduct” has yet to receive the same aggregation and attention that clergy sexual abuse has by the media (although The Washington Post has rung a warning bell and Carol Shakeshaft has written extensively on it in academic work). As the John Jay researchers note, “No other institution has undertaken a public study of sexual abuse and, as a result, there are no comparable data to those collected and reported by the Catholic Church” (p. 5).

“It is happening in other institutions” is by no means any sort of excuse and that is not what is intended by referring to these realities. Instead, these other cases provide a context, which becomes important when someone who reads news of abuse occurring decades ago in churches in Pennsylvania decides to attack a priest today in Indiana or when a parent feels their children will be less safe in a Catholic school than a public school. It also points to the dangers of thinking that incidents of sexual abuse are unique to Catholic institutions.

As the grand jury report authors note, the Church has changed in the last 15 years. But you cannot “fix” the past nor can it be erased. This won’t all fade away. It’s nothing that can ever be outrun. You have to deal with it. The Church did not sufficiently do so in 2002 and the years that followed. Creating new policies to prevent future abuse are not a sufficient response to the legacy of what happened. Now, in 2018, it is time to lift the veil of any secrecy that remains. If not, the same cases will emerge again and again as if these were a wound that scabs but never heals. Every time that scab is removed it will bleed again and again. As painful as it is now, it is the time to deal with this great injury the Church brought upon itself. If anything, the re-emergence of these cases again and again should reveal that this wound has potentially deadly consequences if it is not dealt with completely once and for all.


Update 8/29: Some reactions to this post have asked about the impact of known delays in reporting by victims. There has been no substantial shifting forward in time of the alleged abuse trend between 2002 and 2017. The accusations continue to fit the historical pattern. We’d expect the trend to move forward in the last 15 years if reporting delays were evident but this has not been the case. No new wave of allegations similar to the past has occurred to date. It is also likely that most, if not all, the Pennsylvania cases are already in existing reported accusation totals.

Update 8/30: We continue to hear feedback about the delays in reporting related to the age of the victim. The data regarding accusations in the Catholic Church specifically appear to be much more event-driven than age-driven. Rather than victims reaching a certain age and coming forward, it has more often been the case that abuse being in the news that has led victims to come forward in large numbers. The figure below is from the John Jay research (p. 9) and shows when allegations were reported up to 2002. One can see the spike in the 1990s after a series of cases in the news and again in a larger magnitude in 2002 in the wake of news of abuse cases in Boston. Since 2004, new allegations have averaged 618 per year (438 in 2017). Regardless of when reports are made, the accusations often fit the existing pattern described above for when the abuse occurred. Four allegations of abuse occurring in 2017 were made in 2017.

Is Partisanship Trumping Faith?

The electoral system in the United States (first-past-the-post with single member districts) generates a two party system. Sociologically speaking, this is not a great outcome. It leads to resilient party bonds almost like a form of tribal membership. In dichotomies, people tend to operate with strong in-group, out-group attitudes and behaviors. They favor their in-group, often to irrational extremes, and disfavor the out group strongly. The in-group is believed to be ideal—especially when it is compared to the evil incarnate out-group. In the age of cable news and social media this quasi-tribalism has developed a new wrinkle—fandom. People have begun to operate as if their party affiliation is the core of their personality and worldview.

For Catholics there is an additional hurdle. They are essentially politically “homeless” in this two party system. Both party platforms have major components which conflict with Church teachings and directives. It is argued that Democrats are often out of step in terms of life issues, with the exception of the death penalty, and Republicans are often inconsistent with issues regarding the preferential option for the poor and vulnerable—including the social safety net and the treatment of immigrants and refugees. Again arguably, there are many other inconsistencies. At the same time, each party is consistent with the Church on some issues as well.

Most Catholics in the U.S.—more than 8 in 10—enter the Church as infants. They acquire an awareness of the political system and partisanship in their tween and teen years—often taking cues from parents, other family, and peers. Some never choose to politically affiliate or switch affiliations at some point. So how does one come to be a Catholic Democrat or a Catholic Republican? Well, more often than not, Catholicism takes a back seat to party and people gravitate toward emphasizing the issues in which their party is consistent with the Church when the topic of religion comes up.

The U.S. bishops, in their election document Faithful Citizenship, explain, “A Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who favors a policy promoting an intrinsically evil act, such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, deliberately subjecting workers or the poor to subhuman living conditions, redefining marriage in ways that violate its essential meaning, or racist behavior, if the voter’s intent is to support that position [emphasis added]. In such cases, a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in grave evil. At the same time, a voter should not use a candidate’s opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity.” In short, when choosing who to affiliate with or vote for, Catholics should not affiliate with or vote for a party or candidate specifically because they hold a position inconsistent with Church teachings. However, they should vote for a candidate or party because they specifically do offer policies that are consistent with Church teachings. 

In one sense, Catholics have actually become less partisan over time. In 1972, according the General Social Survey (GSS), about seven in ten Catholic adults identified either as a Democrat or as a Republican. This has declined over time and in 2016, only 58% identified with a party (23% don’t identify with a party but “lean” towards one and 19% are independents or support some “third” party). This shift occurred as fewer Catholics affiliated with the Democrats (54% in 1972 to 36% in 2016) and more with the Republicans (15% in 1972 to 22% in 2016).

Thus, today, 42% are “non-identifiers” with either major party. They’ve embraced their political homelessness, for now. Even without a party home one could still believe in an ideology—which is also an important component of American political culture. In 1974, according to the GSS, 24% of adult Catholics identified as a Left or Right “ideologue” (extremely liberal, liberal, conservative, or extremely conservative). In 2016, 32% claimed a liberal or conservative ideology. Most Catholics, 68% are either moderates (42%) or only “slightly” liberal (11%) or “slightly” conservative (15%). Once you combine ideology and partisanship together you get this distribution:

About one in ten Catholics are liberal Democrats (9.8%) and slightly fewer are conservative Republicans (8.2%). Most are unaffiliated and non-ideological (30.5%). The rest are some combination of party affiliation without ideology or ideology without affiliation, and then one last group where party affiliation and ideology are seemingly inconsistent. These Catholics “in the middle” are presumably those most open to policies and candidates that do not meet the rigid partisan and ideological positions of the two major political parties. They may be more able to find a space for their faith in their political discernment and choices.

Altogether 21% of Catholic adults have a partisan affiliation and a conservative or liberal ideology. As shown below, this is the same as adults without any religious affiliation (i.e., Nones) and similar to other non-Christians. However, one in four Christians who are not Catholic have a partisan affiliation and are ideological. Only the religiously unaffiliated are more likely than Catholics to be unaffiliated with a political party and without a conservative or liberal ideology.

Over time, the number of unaffiliated and non-ideological Catholics has grown. In the 1970s, 28% of Catholics were without party or ideology and this remained stable through the 1980s and 1990s. In the 2000s, this group increased its share to 33% of Catholics and has inched up another percentage point in the 2010s. A key difference in terms of religious practice is that those with partisan affiliations and ideologies are more likely than those without these to be in the pews at Mass regularly. About a third of the affiliated and ideological attends Mass weekly (another 24% attends monthly) compared to only 19% of the non-ideological and unaffiliated attending weekly (another 24% attends at least once a month).

Politically, issue-to-issue, there are not large differences between Catholic Republicans, Democrats and those unaffiliated with a party. Yet, there is a high-profile basket of issues—often those most likely to be in the news where sharp divisions, even polarization, emerges. Sometimes Democrats are out of step with the Church and at other times Republicans are.

For example, look below at the distribution of respondents, by party affiliation, for the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) question about abortion. Yes, Republicans respond differently than Democrats but not to the extremes seen in many other questions. Note that there are many Democrats who do not support abortion as a matter of personal choice (50%) and there are Republicans who do (29%). Many Catholics simply do not take the cues from their political parties on abortion as they do on some other big issues. They also often aren’t agreeable with what the Church teaches.

Data from the GSS, over time, show that Catholics, all U.S. adults, and every other conceivable sub-group that can be measured (including weekly Mass attending Catholics) have a divided opinion on abortion. It all comes down to circumstance more than political party or faith. A majority of Catholics do not support legal abortion for “any reason,” pregnancy without marriage, being unable to afford more children, or just not wanting more children. Majorities support legal abortion if the pregnancy is a result of a rape, that the woman’s health is seriously endangered, or there is a strong chance of birth defect with the child. This divide has been stable over time since the 1970s.

Also in the GSS, strong majorities of Catholics oppose assisted suicide for people who are tired of living and who are ready to die. They’ve consistently opposed this since the late 1970s. At the same time, majorities of Catholics have also supported and continue to support allowing for assisted suicide if a patient has a disease that can not be cured and has a desire to die. (...The only life issue showing significant change over time has been a rising opposition to the death penalty for convicted murders. Currently, 41% of Catholics oppose this compared 27% in 1988).

There is a greater divide among Catholics, by party, on an issue like gun control. Seventy-seven percent of Catholic Democrats support making it more difficult in the future for people to buy a gun. Thirty-seven percent of Republicans agree but a majority would like to keep the rules for gun buying the same (56%). Few, of any affiliation, would like to see it become easier to buy a gun in the future. Just as a note, the USCCB’s Faithful Citizenship cites the importance of “supporting reasonable restrictions on access to assault weapons and handguns.”

There is undivided support among Catholics for increases in federal spending on dealing with crime (The USCCB also notes the importance of “effective responses to violent crime”). Seventy-two percent of Republicans support this as do 69% of Democrats, and 66% of those unaffiliated with a party. About a quarter of each group would like this funding kept the same. Few of any party affiliation would like to see this funding decreased.

What about immigration? Here too Catholics are not always fractured by party as some might assume. As shown below, majorities of Catholic Democrats, Republicans, and those unaffiliated with a political party favor unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States to remain and qualify for U.S. citizenship if they meet certain requirements (i.e., “like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks”). Indeed, one in four Republicans would like to make all unauthorized immigrants felons and then send them back to their country (along with 8% of Democrats and 13% of the politically unaffiliated). Yet, three in four Republicans would seek to allow them to remain under various scenarios. On the part of the USCCB they would like to see “comprehensive immigration reform that offers a path to citizenship, treats immigrant workers fairly, prevents the separation of families, maintains the integrity of our borders, respects the rule of law, and addresses the factors that compel people to leave their own countries.”

Support for the children brought by unauthorized immigrant parents to be allowed to stay is even more widespread. Seventy-three percent of Catholic Republicans support this as do 87% of Democrats and 81% of those without a party affiliation. Yet, there are some immigration questions with less consistency across party identifications. For example, 75% of Republicans oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States (6% favor this and 19% neither favor nor oppose). Democrats are no mirror image. Despite the Church’s call to support refugees only 33% of Catholic Democrats favor bringing Syrian refugees to the U.S. (32% oppose it and 35% neither support nor oppose this). The USCCB is clear in noting, “The Gospel mandate to ‘welcome the stranger’ requires Catholics to care for and stand with newcomers, authorized and unauthorized, including unaccompanied immigrant children, refugees and asylum-seekers, those unnecessarily detained, and victims of human trafficking.”

There is one immigration issue where political polarization is very clearly evident. Sixty percent of Catholic Republicans favor building a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico. By comparison, 65% of Democrats oppose this. As shown below, non-partisans have a divided opinion about the wall. Echoing a sentiment he has made numerous times, Pope Francis remarked to a general audience in February 2017 that “In the social and civil context as well, I appeal not to create walls but to build bridges.” The USCCB has advised, “The right and responsibility of nations to control their borders and to maintain the rule of law should be recognized but pursued in a just and humane manner.”

As one might expect there is also a divide on an issue like climate change but upon closer inspection there remains some common ground. This of course is an issue that Pope Francis has focused a lot of his attention on. The USCCB is clear as well, “Our Conference offers a distinctive call to seriously address global climate change.” Fewer than one in five Catholics of any partisan affiliation believe that rising global temperatures occur mostly through natural causes. Where a difference emerges is in just how much the human contribution to climate change is. Democrats are divided on whether it is mostly human activity (44%) or equally human activity and natural causes (40%). Republicans are more likely to believe there is some natural causes contributing along with human activity (60%) rather than humans being mostly responsible (21%). Regardless, whether Democrat or Republican there is common agreement that human activity is contributing to climate change. There is disagreement in how much. Those unaffiliated with a party have views similar to Democrats.

Oddly, perhaps the greatest polarization among Catholics, likely caused by partisanship, is related to issues of wealth and poverty—one area of policy and law that should be clear to any Catholic from the Gospel to the Catechism, to Faithful Citizenship. While previously noting the agreement among Catholics of different party affiliations regarding federal funding for dealing with crime, there is not the same shared point of view for federal funding for aid to the poor. Sixty-two percent of Democrats would like to see this increased compared to only 31% of Republicans and 34% of those unaffiliated with a party. Nearly half of these two latter groups would like this funding to stay at current levels. More than one in five Republicans would like to see this funding decreased (as do 10% of Democrats and 18% of those without a party affiliation).

Divides are also evident in responses to questions about government involvement in reducing income inequalities (note: there is broad and strong agreement among Catholics of all party affiliations for laws requiring employers to pay men and women the same amount for the same work). Democrats strongly favor, at 78%, increasing income taxes on people making over $1 million a year. While a majority of Republicans do as well (54%), many oppose (20%) or neither favor nor oppose (26%) this proposition. Those who are unaffiliated with a party closely mirror Democrats.

Finally on the economic front, a slight majority of Democrats favor the government trying to reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and poorest households (56%). Fewer Republicans (30%) and those unaffiliated with a party (40%) favor this method of reducing inequality. Sizeable numbers of all groups neither favor nor oppose this step and Republicans are most likely to oppose it (46%).

While there is some polarization—largely driven by partisanship—among U.S. Catholics, there is common ground as well. Perhaps more important, a sizeable number of Catholics aren’t rooting for either “team.” Looking back at the figures above, if you focus on the purple bars—representing those unaffiliated with a political party—you’ll notice that these Catholics are the most consistent with the Church’s positions on issues, with one important exception. Republicans are more consistent with the Church’s position on the legality of abortion than any other group. That’s not saying much when the total share of Republicans who are congruent is just 19%. However, 40% of those unaffiliated with a party believe abortion should be legal as a matter of personal choice, which is about as far from the position of the Church as one could get.

On other issues though, the “purple” non-partisan Catholics, as a majority, support: more gun control (57%), that unauthorized immigrants be allowed to remain and qualify for citizenship if requirements are met (63%), that unauthorized immigrant children who have lived in the U.S. for at least 10 years and graduated from high school should be allowed to live and work in the U.S. (81%), that aid to the poor should not be reduced (82%), that employers should be required to pay women the same amount as men for the same work (87%), and increasing taxes on people making over $1 million a year (72%). As a plurality this sub-group opposes building a wall on the border (43%), believes climate change is caused mostly by human activity (41%), and favors the government taking steps to reduce income inequality (40%). Neither Catholic Democrats nor Republicans are this consistent with the positions of the Church.

In recent elections, Catholics are the only major religious group that has switched the party it votes for over time. Protestants vote Republican in each election. Non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated vote for Democrats each time. According to Exit Polls, in 2000, 2002, 2006, and 2008 Catholics voted in the majority for Democrats. In 2004, 2010, 2014, and 2016 Catholics voted for Republicans (2012 was a 50/50 split). I believe this is related to a metaphorical “drinking problem.” There is realistically only red and blue “Kool-Aid” on the table in our party system. Have Catholics, over time, been mixing these into something purple? Unfortunately, in any given election you have to choose one or the other (I’ll stay “politically sober” and stick with clear water). The key for the Church is to have Catholics choose, using their informed conscience, but to then not buy so strongly into the tribalism and fandom of partisanship as it exists today. Doing so could prevent Catholics from seeking common political ground that is more consistent with their common faith. That ground does exist in many of the figures shown above. Yet the issues where polarization is evident tend to burn more brightly at this time...

This post is a summary of what I presented at “Overcoming Polarization in a Divided Nation Through Catholic Social Thought” on June 4, 2018. This event was organized and hosted by Georgetown’s Initiative on Catholic Social Thought and Public Life. For more about Catholic partisanship and voting check out Catholics and US Politics After the 2016 Elections: Understanding the Swing Vote (Eds. Marie Gayte, Blandine Chelini-Pont, and Mark J. Rozell. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). I wrote the chapter on “Catholics and the 2016 Elections.”

Inkblot image courtesy of Håkan Dahlström.

Is It Healthy to be Catholic?

Religion and health are a thing. There is even a journal devoted to the topic. The correlations between being religious and being in good health are numerous (extensive meta-analysis here). Religious people are less likely to smoke and more likely to exercise than non-religious people. Religious people eat healthier diets and have lower blood cholesterol levels than the non-religious. Yet, those healthier diets and more exercise have not led religious people to necessarily have lower body weights, on average, than the non-religious. Healthier lifestyles of religious Americans do appear though to impact heart health and blood pressure relative to the outcomes of non-religious people in the country. The religious also have higher functioning immune and endocrine systems, on average. Religious Americans are even less likely to get cancer than the non-religious and when they do get a diagnosis they often have a better prognosis for recovery. All of this leads to a rather surprising conclusion:

“The most impressive research on the relationship between R/S [religion and/or spirituality] and physical health is in the area of mortality. ... At least 121 studies have examined relationships between R/S and mortality. … Considering the 63 methodologically most rigorous studies (quality ratings of 8 or higher), 47 (75%) found R/S predicting greater longevity (two at trend level), whereas three (5%) reported shorter longevity. Another systematic review and two meta-analyses have confirmed this relationship between R/S and longer survival. The effects have been particularly strong for frequency of attendance at religious services in these three reviews. Survival among frequent attendees was increased on average by 37%, 43%, and 30% (mean effect being 37% across these reviews). An increased survival of 37% is highly significant and equivalent to the effects of cholesterol lowering drugs or exercise-based cardiac rehabilitation after myocardial infarction on survival.” –Harold G. Koenig, M.D., Duke University, “Religion, Spirituality, and Health: The Research and Clinical Implications”

The potential pathways for these outcomes are numerous. Religious people tend to be members of religious communities and these offer support in a variety of ways. Being religious may also reduce stress and have other positive psychological benefits that are related to physical health outcomes. Religious people, on average, also appear to be less likely than non-religious people to engage in behaviors that come with increased health risks.

But how healthy is Catholicism? According to the General Social Survey (GSS) the average Catholic adult male is 5 feet 8 inches and weighs 189 pounds. The average adult female is 5 feet 4 inches and weighs 158 pounds. Body Mass Index (BMI) combines this information into a single number that indicates whether one is underweight, normal weight, overweight, or obese. The average Catholic adult has a BMI of 27.2. This is lower than people of other affiliations. Overall, 36% of adult Catholics are of a normal weight (a small percentage are underweight). About four in ten are overweight and about a quarter are obese. Again, these numbers are generally better than those of other religious affiliations and similar to those with no religious affiliation (“None” are also disproportionately younger with an average age of 40.6 compared to 47.7 for Catholics and 50.5 for other Christians). As existing research shows, the GSS confirms that religion and spirituality are not linked to lower weights. However, among the religious, Catholics appear to be the least likely to be obese.

Most Catholics say they are in excellent or good health and are more likely to say this is excellent than those of other religious affiliations. Those without an affiliation are just as likely to say they are in excellent health. There is a relationship between one’s BMI and their self-reported health. Americans of a normal weight are most likely to report being in excellent or good health. Those who are overweight are less likely to do so and those who are obese are least likely to self-report this.

Catholics are less likely than those of other religious affiliations to report they have ever been diagnosed with high blood pressure, arthritis, depression, or diabetes. Those without a religious affiliation have a similar health profile to Catholics with an additional reduced risk of arthritis (again likely related to average age differences). Here again, with each illness, the higher your BMI, the more likely you are to have had a diagnosis. Thirty-eight percent of obese adults have been diagnosed with high blood pressure compared to 13% of those with normal weights. Twenty-two percent of obese respondents indicated they had a diagnosis of arthritis compared to 10% of those with normal weights. Fifteen percent of the obese have diagnosed diabetes compared to 4% of those with normal weights. Even depression is slightly more common among adults with obesity than those with normal weights (18% compared to 13%).

Thirty-eight percent of those with normal weights report that they are very happy (an additional 55% are pretty happy). Only 28% of those with obesity say they are very happy (61% say they are pretty happy). Christians in America, whether they are Catholic, Protestant, or some other affiliation, are more likely than those of other religious affiliations or no affiliation to say they are very happy.

While the GSS offers only one snapshot for these questions it is a remarkable one in that Catholics appear to be among the healthiest of Americans in body and mind. We can assume spiritual health likely correlates well with these aspects. The GSS does show that Catholics who attend Mass more frequently are more likely than infrequent attenders to say they are very happy.

Overall differences in health between Catholics and others are small but consistently positive. While no one should be writing prescriptions for Catholic baptisms yet it does appear that there are certainly no ill health effects from being a member of the faith in the United States. 

Update: I had a reader ask about running regressions and I took a look with OLS and Logit (where appropriate) to test the findings further. Catholics, controlling for age, gender, and years of education have a lower BMI (by 0.83) than non-Catholics (p = .03). Catholics are also less likely than non-Catholics to have been diagnosed with hypertension (p = .01). Note that non-Catholics includes those with religious affiliations and those without a religious affiliation. The relationships between Catholicism and self-reported health, arthritis, depression, and diabetes do not achieve statistical significance controlling for these other factors. More highly specified models may reveal more but it is safe to say two important health factors, BMI and hypertension, passed regression analysis with standard controls. There is indeed something more here to explore...

Doctor photo courtesy of Alex Proimos.

A Dip in the Adult Catholic Population

The U.S. adult population grew by 6.3% from 2010 to 2016. Growth in the numbers of adults self-identifying as Catholic have not kept pace and are falling into negative territory, according to an analysis of survey data in combination with Census numbers for adults. Since 2010, the adult Catholic population in the United States has declined by 0.9% (equivalent to a net loss of 511,558 adults affiliating). The number of adult Catholics declined from 59.1 million in 2010 to 58.6 million in 2016. The rate of decline has been nearly identical for Hispanic adult Catholics (-0.8%, 176,296 fewer affiliated) and non-Hispanic adult Catholics (-0.9%, 335,262 fewer affiliated).

The share of U.S. adults who self-identify as Catholic declined from 25.2% in 2010 to 23.5% in 2016. The share of Hispanic adults who self-identify as Catholic declined from 63.1% in 2010 to 53.8% in 2016. At the same time, there was strong growth in the overall Hispanic adult population of 16.3% between 2010 and 2016. So even with the drop in Catholic affiliation, the share of all adult Catholics who self-identify their ethnicity as Hispanic or Latino did not change from 2010 to 2016 and remains at 35.4%.

What is Happening?
Population changes have several components. There are births, deaths, and immigration factors to consider. When looking at adult populations specifically because the Census does not ask religion questions and surveys are generally only done with those 18 and older, one must also consider changes in the cohorts entering the adult population over time. Finally, one must account for changes in religious affiliation (i.e., people converting in and switching out).

In 2009, the overall fertility rate in the United States was 2.0. This is very near the “replacement rate” of 2.1 where the population is “replacing itself.” Fertility fell with the recession and had not recovered by 2015 when the fertility rate was 1.84. Americans are having fewer and fewer children, even as they report similar numbers of “ideal numbers of children” in the General Social Survey (GSS) as respondents did in the past.

What about Catholics? Religion-specific fertility rates are not something that can be calculated by the Census Bureau or CDC with existing data. However, in the GSS we can derive estimates of the number of children Catholic women are having over time. As shown in the figure below, there was a big shift from women born in the 1920s and 1930s (having children in the late 1930s to as the early 1980s) to women born in the 1940s and on. However, a generally shared pattern is evident across cohorts from those born in the 1950s to the 1990s. In the data we can see, it appears Catholic women are, on average, having children just above the replacement rate by their 50s. It is far too early to know if this will continue for Catholic women born in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, there is nothing in the data now that points to a significant change.

The best indicator of the numbers of infants and children entering the Catholic Church is in baptism data (from The Official Catholic Directory or OCD). Here is the first sign of something amiss. The figure below shows the number of new people entering the Church as minors and as adults annually. In 1996, there were 1.15 million new entrants (87% under the age of 18 and 13% age 18 or older). In 2016, these numbers had declined by 28% with 828,702 entering the Church (88% under the age of 18 and 12% age 18 or older). The declines have been similar for both minor and adult entries.

This means there are fewer new Catholics entering the faith every year. The light green bars consist mostly of infant baptisms. Thus, most of these entries are not yet adults from 2001 and later. These declines are not yet measured in national polls but will become evident in the coming years. Where they are very evident now is in enrollment numbers at Catholic schools and parish-based religious education programs. In fact, those baptized in 2003 or later are the next Catholic generation coming of age after the Millennials. At CARA, we have chosen to call them the iGen Catholics. They are on track to be a smaller cohort than their Millennial elders.

If Catholics are continuing to have children at similar rates as in the past why are baptisms decreasing?  Why would a Catholic parent not bring a child to the Church for baptism? Here it might be related to another sacrament—marriage. According to the GSS in the 1970s, nine in ten Catholic mothers between the ages of 18 and 49 were married. In the 2010s, only 62% are married. Nearly a quarter have never married. These parents may be reluctant to come to the Church for baptism of a child. In fact, there is one category of baptisms that is increasing in the Church in the United States. These are baptisms of children and teens (i.e., age 1 to 17). Some Catholic parents are perhaps waiting to baptize until they are married? (Note: we have explored alternative hypothesis).

With marriage there is another potential complication. While the number of Catholics marrying had been in a bit of decline since the mid-1990s, this began to change in 2011 as the economy came out of recession, as shown in the figure below (estimates are made using government data on marriages, surveys, and the number of Catholic marriages reported in the OCD). At the same time, now more than ever, these marriages often do not occur in the Catholic Church. In 1970, three in four Catholics who were getting married got married in the Church (426,309 marriages out of an estimated 565,124 Catholics marrying in this year). This fell below 50% for the first time in 1982 when 347,445 Catholics married in the Church. Yet, as recently as 1996, half of Catholics marrying were still getting married in the Church. After 1996, a slow decline began and by 2016 only 144,148 unions were celebrated in Catholic parishes (29% of all Catholics marrying in this year).

Thus, even among Catholic parents who are married and have had their first child, there may be some hesitancy to bring that child to the Church for baptism if they had not married in the Church. If they had children before marrying (…or were simply living together at the same address) they may also be hesitant to seek marriage in the Church.

It is also important to note that marriage in the Church has an important “rebound” effect on adult entries. The most common reason given by adults converting to Catholicism for switching their religion is that they are marrying a Catholic. Fewer marriages in the Church between Catholics and non-Catholics will result in fewer adult entries into the faith. In 2015, 23% of marriages in the Church were between a Catholic and non-Catholic spouse. In 1996, 31% of marriages in the Church were between Catholics and non-Catholics and there were more marriages celebrated overall.

Even with the declines in total annual entries, more than 700,000 new Catholics under 18 added to the population every year is still a significant sum. But how many of them stay Catholic? This is another issue of concern when thinking about population changes. According to the GSS, prior to 1994, about eight in ten or more adults raised Catholic remained Catholic as adults (i.e., when surveyed). This “retention rate” fell into the 70%-79% range through 2008. Since that time, about two-thirds of adults raised Catholic remain Catholic now (there are even higher retention rates among adult entrants. Also it is important to note that some Catholics who leave return later as “reverts”). The figure below shows recent changes in retention rates among Hispanic and non-Hispanic Catholics. What is notable here is a drop in retention rates among Hispanics raised Catholic from 77% in 2010 to 69% in 2016.

This drop in retention has resulted in a decline in the affiliation rate for Hispanics. As previously noted, in 2010, 63% of Hispanic adults in the U.S. self-identified as Catholic. Only 54% did so in 2016. Retention and affiliation rates among non-Hispanic Catholics have remained stable in the short-term. Declining affiliation among Hispanic Catholics should be of great concern to the Church because a majority of Catholics under the age of 18, those of the iGen, are Hispanic.

To put these changes into a bigger context we can look at what changes occur over time among U.S. adults by ancestry to a particular country (as reported in the GSS). As shown in the figure below, descendants of people who immigrated from countries where Catholicism is widespread often show diminishing affiliation over time. Coming from a very Catholic country to one with abundant religious pluralism and religious freedoms is a dramatic cultural change. It should not be surprising that religious switching out of Catholicism occurs across generations. I often think of this as a “regression toward the mean.” That mean in the United States is about a quarter of the population who self-identifies as Catholic. If this is the case, we might expect Hispanic Catholic affiliation rates to continue to fall in the coming years. It is also the case Hispanic affiliation rates are dependent on where Hispanic immigration is coming from. In the United States, majorities of self-identified Mexicans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans self-identify their religion as Catholic. However, minorities of Cubans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans say they are Catholic.

Another factor to consider is mortality. Assuming that Catholics are not more or less likely to die than others in the United States we can use Gallup’s Catholic affiliation percentage along with government data on deaths to estimate the number of Catholics who die each year. This can be subtracted from new entrants. Here the Catholic Church has long been in positive territory and remains so today. There are more new Catholics entering the faith each year than those who pass away. Yet the margins are tightening.

In 1996, there were an estimated 578,750 Catholic deaths. By comparison, 1.15 million entered the faith in this year. That’s a net difference of more than 570,000. Parish reported funerals for 1996 indicate that about 80% of Catholics who passed away in that year received a Church funeral and/or burial. In 2015, there were an estimated 640,076 Catholic deaths. Nearly 870,494 new entrants joined the faith in this year for a net gain of 215,044. Also notable, only 63% of Catholics who died in this year likely received a Church funeral and/or burial. Just as with baptisms and marriages, we have a bit of a mystery. Why are fewer Catholics coming to the Church to bury their elders who have passed away?

The last factor to consider, which is difficult to estimate, is immigration. But we do know that 39% of foreign born adults in the United States self-identified their religion as Catholic in 2016 compared to 50% in 2006. That is a big shift. In addition to Hispanic Catholic retention rates and affiliation rates falling it also the case that some foreign-born Hispanic Catholics who used to reside in the United States have left. In some cases, the numbers moving out are larger than those coming into the United States (see: More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S.).

In the end, a net Catholic population loss of -0.9% or -511,558 adults between 2010 and 2016 is a relatively minor event. At the same time, there seem to be a lot of moving parts to the shifts in the Catholic population going on underneath this change. Understanding the decline in new entrants is essential. This is a dynamic that is happening at the level of the family where it meets the parish community. Something is disconnected. Trends in retention rates are also troubling. The median age young Catholics are leaving the faith is 13 with about half joining another religion and the other half having no affiliation.

Is this all the canary in coal mine? No. Globally, the Church continues to grow and the United States represents less than 6% of the world’s Catholics. What I have described above is the best current view of the data we have in this country. I’ve presented a few hypotheses. There are many more. It is also easy to think these changes are related to something that the Church specifically is or is not doing. Yet many other affiliations are experiencing much more significant declines. Generally speaking, these trends are also likely to be related to broader shifts in popular culture, the economy, the family, and to bring it back to the iGen—technology. There is so much more to explore. Stay tuned to this blog...

Resources used for these estimates:
U.S. Census and CDC
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/deaths.htm
General Social Survey
http://sda.berkeley.edu/archive.htm
Pew Research Center, Hispanic Trends
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/20/the-nations-latino-population-is-defined-by-its-youth/
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/
Child Trends
https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/racial-and-ethnic-composition-of-the-child-population/
The Official Catholic Directory
http://www.officialcatholicdirectory.com/OCD/home
Gallup
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx